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Dual candidacy as a source of legislator behaviour. The re-election and the mandate 
incentive under mixed-member electoral rules 
 
 
Abstract 
Legislators are often viewed as ‘single-minded seekers of re-election’, and hence their actions 
are attributed to their ultimate goal of staying in office. However, an alternative approach 
‘liberates’ legislators from the ever continuing struggle for re-election and argues that MPs 
carry out certain tasks simply because it is part of their jobs. This study is an attempt to 
empirically separate re-election and mandate incentives in the MPs’ behaviour. Hungary’s 
mixed-member electoral system with dual candidacy creates a situation in which the two 
types of incentives can be separately observed. If mandate incentives prevail there should be a 
difference between SMD and list MPs, while re-election motivations offer the dominant 
explanation to MP behaviour if the difference is between MPs nominated in SMDs and those 
who are not. Analysing legislators’ attitudes and behaviour between 2010 and 2014 it is found 
that although re-election incentives indeed prevail in the MPs’ behaviour, the effect of the 
mandate strongly characterizes attitudes creating a tension between what MPs do and what 
they think they should be doing. 
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Introduction 
When studying the determinants of representational roles and legislator behaviour, scholars 
very often turn to electoral rules as the most important explanatory factor. Building on the 
article of Carey and Shugart (1995) numerous empirical work demonstrate a connection 
between electoral systems and work in the constituency (Lundberg 2006), pork barrel politics 
(Stratmann and Baur 2002), representational attitudes (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005; 
Pilet, Freire, and Costa 2012), legislative (Bräuninger, Brunner, and Däubler 2012; Erik S. 
Herron 2002) and non-legislative (Manow 2013) parliamentary work. The overarching 
hypothesis of the literature is that candidate-centred electoral rules encourage personalised 
representation and constituency orientation, whereas party-centred rules provide incentives 
for the representation of party interests. 
 
Legislative scholars often argue that legislators strategically react to electoral rules in a way 
that maximizes their chances of re-election. The re-election incentive is viewed the main 
catalyst for the forming of representational roles, and legislators are labelled as ‘single-
minded seekers of re-election’ (Mayhew 1974). Nevertheless, an alternative approach 
‘liberates’ legislators from the ever continuing struggle for re-election and argues that 
Members of Parliament (MPs) carry out certain tasks simply because it is part of their jobs. 
For instance, legislators elected in single-member districts (SMDs) adopt constituency 
service, because it is considered as part of the job (henceforth the mandate incentive). The 
mandate incentive is thus qualitatively different from the re-election incentive: MPs act the 
way they do primarily because of what is in their ‘job descriptions’, and not because they 
want to be re-elected. These ‘job descriptions’ are crafted by both voters and parties. 
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At this point, it seems that both the re-election and the mandate incentives lead to the same 
outcome: no matter which type of incentives shape their behaviour SMD MPs are always 
more constituency oriented, while list MPs follow the party line. This eventually makes it 
difficult to empirically identify and separate the two incentives. One of the consequences of 
this is that most of the time, when presenting evidence on the effect of electoral rules on 
representational roles and legislator behaviour, we are only able to guess the causal 
mechanism. Building on the professionalization of politics, i.e. the fact that the legislators’ 
livelihood depends on re-election, the majority of authors prefers the re-election inventive as 
the main explanatory mechanism. But are they right to do so? The primary aim of this article 
is to find out how legislators accommodate these two incentives – incentives generated by 
their mandates and their re-election seeking – in their role perceptions and behaviour. 
 
In order to separate the re-election and the mandate incentives, one needs an electoral system, 
in which these two types of motivations do not always align. A mixed-member electoral 
system with dual candidacy represents a situation just like this. Legislators elected from party 
lists may pursue an SMD career, and thus adopt strategies different from what would logically 
follow from their positions as list MPs. If the behaviour of list MPs with SMD ambitions 
resembles that of SMD MPs, the re-election incentive is likely to play an important role, and 
the mandate divide (i.e. the difference between SMD and list MPs) diminishes. Similarly, if 
list MPs with SMD candidacy are more similar to list MPs without SMD nomination than to 
SMD MPs, mandate motivations dominate MP behaviour. To measure these two incentives, I 
use the Hungarian MP data from the 2010 wave of the Comparative Candidates Survey as 
well as legislator activity record from the 2010-2014 parliament. 
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The re-election and the mandate incentive 
The re-election incentive 
Looking at legislator behaviour from the viewpoint of the re-election incentive, very simply 
put, MPs behave the way they do because they expect their actions to translate into a better 
chance at re-selection, and eventually, votes at the next elections (for a detailed overview of 
the argument see Papp and Russo 2018). Consequently, MPs look into the future when 
making decisions about splitting their resources between the various tasks (such as 
constituency service and representing party interests) in the present. Re-election and re-
selection tend to be negative political incentives: the cost of not meeting the expectations of 
the party and the voters is bad reputation, and ultimately, de-selection and failing at the next 
elections. The decision on what types of activities MPs should prioritize depends primarily on 
electoral rules. 
 
One of the most frequently cited characteristics of single member majority systems is that it 
creates a strong linkage of accountability (Lancaster 1986; Mitchell 2000; Norris 2000; Scholl 
1986), that makes re-election seekers more vulnerable to the pressure from the electorate 
(Cooper and Richardson 2006). MPs must carry out constituency service, stay visible, be 
responsive to constituent demand and represent the interests of their local voters. 
Additionally, as voters can easily identify who to approach with their problems (Scholl 1986), 
and MPs are also better known by the electorate (Cooper and Richardson 2006), single 
member districts tend to generate larger demand for constituency service than multi-member 
districts (MMDs). 
 
Contrarily, in MMDs with a geographical overlap among representatives (Heitshusen, Young, 
and Wood 2005) legislators can delegate problem-solving to other MPs (Gallagher and 
5 
 
Holliday 2003), and thus the link of accountability becomes confused. In such systems, 
legislators are more accountable to the party selectorate than to the electorate (Norris 2004), 
which makes the contest for re-election a fight for higher positions on the party lists (Curtice 
and Shively 2009). Therefore, sometimes the re-election incentive aims at re-selection (Strøm 
1997). Empirical evidence suggests that parties are indeed not blind to what MPs do, and MP 
behaviour very often translates to better re-selection chances (Baumann, Debus, and 
Klingelhöfer 2017; Borghetto and Lisi 2018; Däubler, Christensen, and Linek 2018; 
Marangoni and Russo 2018). 
 
The mandate incentive 
On the other hand, the selection model of representation, for instance, assumes that the main 
goal of legislators is to pursue good public policy, and voters choose representatives to act in 
their best interests independent of their desire to be re-elected (Fearon 1999; Mansbridge 
2009). Thus, it is not only the re-election incentive motivating MPs to act on behalf of their 
districts, but constituency service may be considered as part of the job legislators carry out 
with no regard to the consequences. The feeling of responsibility for the voters is also part of 
the job perception, just as the satisfaction with a well-done job (Norton 2002). MPs may also 
enjoy working in the constituency more than they enjoy parliamentary work because they get 
an instant feedback about the quality of their work (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987). These 
feelings, perceptions and obligations are independent of the re-election incentive, and can be 
perceived as being related to the mandate. 
 
One should not underestimate the importance of job descriptions and workplace norms. Being 
a legislator is like holding any other job: legislators have to engage in activities delegated to 
them, and which activities perhaps do not yield any advantages at the next elections. This is 
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especially true in the case of legislators elected on closed party lists, where ‘invisible’ 
parliamentary work may be a priority over constituency representation (Papp 2019). 
Furthermore, as to constituency casework, comparative data suggests that, on average, being 
in touch with the voters’ problems is a more important incentive to legislators than re-
selection and re-election when it comes to performing constituency service (see Figure 1). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Although it is to assume that these two types of motivations drive MP role perceptions and 
behaviour at the same time, their relative weight may vary. In some cases, the re-election 
incentive is the dominant driving force of MP behaviour, while in others, the effect of the 
mandate is more pronounced. Nevertheless, the professionalization of politics makes the re-
election incentive comparatively more important than motivations related to the mandate. If 
the representatives’ daily living is dependent upon the choices they make as MPs (Mayhew 
1974), they will probably act in the favour of whoever is in charge of the MPs’ re-selection 
and re-election. 
 
 
Mixed-member electoral systems: a laboratory for separating incentives 
The re-election and the mandate incentives are both related to electoral rules. If MPs want to 
be (re-)elected in SMDs, they carry out constituency service, and are less party-centred, while 
such activities may be too costly for MPs who are elected from party lists, and do not want to 
compete in SMDs. Similarly, constituency service is part of the job for SMD MPs, whereas 
list MPs have weaker ties to the local level, and are expected to attend the party’s business 
(Papp 2019). As being an SMD MP directs legislators toward constituency representation no 
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matter if this is because of the re-election or the mandate incentive, the two effects are almost 
impossible to isolate. However, with the right combination of electoral system characteristics, 
the re-election and the mandate incentives may be empirically separated. 
 
Mixed-member electoral systems are often used by researchers to test the effect of the 
electoral formula on MP roles and behaviour. It has been shown that mandate type affects 
MPs’ perceptions of pork barrel allocation (Lancaster and Patterson 1990), role perceptions 
(Klingemann and Wessels 2001), office allocations (Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss 2006), 
attitudes toward party discipline (Montgomery 1999) as well as the amount of district work 
(Bowler and Farrell 1993). As to the legislators’ tendency to defect the party line at roll-call, 
Thames (2001, 2005) finds evidence for the mandate divide in the case of Russia’s weakly 
institutionalized party system, but rejects the hypothesis in Hungary and Ukraine where 
parties are strong enough to enforce party unity (Thames 2005). However, despite the high 
levels of party system institutionalization, Sieberer (2010) shows that SMD MPs are indeed 
more likely to defect than list MPs in the German Bundestag, while Olivella and Tavits 
(2014) come to the same conclusion while analysing the case of Hungary. 
 
Besides the mandate divide, students of mixed-member electoral rules often discuss cross-tier 
contamination, and identify two sources: (1) parties’ decisions of entering the electoral arena 
which affects the number of competing parties (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Ferrara and Herron 
2005; Eric S. Herron and Nishikawa 2001), and (2) candidate strategies that have 
consequences on the MPs’ strategic behaviour (Bawn and Thies 2003; Crisp 2007; Thames 
2005). From the viewpoint of this study, the second source of contamination is especially 
important. This type of contamination is often the reason why there is sometimes limited 
evidence for a mandate divide (Ishiyama 2000; Lundberg 2006; Morlang 1999): MPs elected 
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in SMDs and party lists are more alike, than it would be suggested based on the attitudes and 
behaviour of MPs elected under pure majority or PR rules. 
 
The degree of cross-tier contamination depends on dual candidacy (i.e. the candidates’ ability 
to run on multiple tiers at the same time), and the parties’ powers in influencing re-election. 
With regard to the former, list MPs who were defeated on the SMD tier may still act as 
‘shadows’ of SMD MPs and carry out constituency service, which makes list MP ‘move 
towards’ SMD MPs in their role perceptions (Carman and Shephard 2007). In the latter case, 
when the re-election of the individual MPs heavily depends on the parties’ support, however, 
SMD MPs show the same behavioural and attitudinal patterns than list members (Bawn and 
Thies 2003; Erik S. Herron 2002; Thames 2005). A good measure for the powers of the party 
is the candidate selection process. Centralized candidate selection strengthens the party’s 
positions against individual MPs, while decentralization leaves a leeway for legislators in 
pursuing their own agendas. 
 
The empirical task of separating the re-election and the mandate incentive 
But how can we separate the re-election from the mandate incentives in a mixed-member 
electoral system? As a first step, important assumptions about the MPs’ behaviour have to be 
made. First, it is to assume that MPs want to be re-selected and re-elected (Mayhew 1974). 
Second, MPs either want to keep their current mandate or obtain a more prestigious one. 
Third, SMD mandates are more prestigious than list mandates (Lundberg 2006; Ward 1998), 
as they often come with more money and resources. The consequence of these assumptions is 
that SMD MPs aim at defending their seats, while list MPs either want to continue on being 
list MPs or will go after one of the SMD mandates. Fourth, MPs formerly nominated in SMDs 
are expected to continue on pursuing this objective at the next elections (Carman and 
9 
 
Shephard 2007; Zittel 2012). This means that former SMD candidacy is considered a proxy 
for MP preferences on their candidacy at the next elections. 
 
Now, let us suppose that MPs may be nominated for types of seats different to which they are 
currently holding. Particularly important is the case of list MPs nominated in SMDs, which 
makes list MPs heterogeneous in terms of electoral incentives. The job description of list MPs 
does not include constituency service, but they may be electorally motivated to ‘shadow’ 
SMD MPs to stand a chance in the SMD at the next elections (Carman and Shephard 2007). 
In such a case, the re-election and the mandate incentives clearly contradict. By observing the 
behaviour of MPs in groups defined by the different combinations of mandate type and SMD 
candidacy, we are able to measure the two types of motivations separately. 
 
Figure 2 presents a stylized picture of the expected results in two cases: strong mandate 
incentive and strong re-election incentive. The vertical axis represents the propensity of 
constituency orientation and voting dissent in parliament. The behaviour of three groups is 
visualized: (1) SMD MPs, (2) list MPs with SMD candidacy at the previous election, and (3) 
list MPs with no SMD candidacy. In the case of a strong mandate incentive (left panel), SMD 
nomination should not motivate constituency orientation and maverick behaviour at roll-call. 
Therefore, Group 2 MPs are expected to have similar behavioural patterns to Group 3 MPs, 
after all, they are all list MPs. Conversely, in the case of a strong re-election inventive (right 
panel), aiming at election in an SMD, Group 2 MPs appear as 'shadows' to Group 1 MPs by 
showing the same type of behaviour. The mandate incentive is the primary mechanism behind 
the mandate divide, while the re-election inventive results in cross-tier contamination. In all 
scenarios, Group 1 MPs are expected to be constituency oriented and more prone to dissent, 
while Group 3 MPs are less focused on the constituency and contribute more to party unity. 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The Hungarian case 
To separate the re-election and the mandate incentives, I take a closer look at the role 
perceptions and parliamentary behaviour of Hungarian MPs during the 2010-2014 electoral 
term. In 2010, a three-tier electoral system was in place with 176 MPs elected in SMDs, and 
210 MPs from closed regional and national party lists. Dual candidacy is a widespread 
practice at the Hungarian elections. Many of the SMD candidates are also nominated on party 
lists (even on both the regional and national level)i, which is a way for parties to secure the re-
election of their most valuable politiciansii. Furthermore, on average, 76 % of MPs nominated 
in SMDs at the previous election continue to compete on the SMD tier at the next election. 
Therefore, although we do not know exactly what kind of mandates individual MPs intend to 
pursue at the next election, it is very likely that former SMD candidates will end up 
competing for an SMD seat. 
 
In 2011, the new election law passed in the Hungarian parliament. From 2014 on, voters elect 
legislators on two tiers (SMD and closed national list tier) into a considerably smaller 
parliament. The number of MPs is decreased from 386 to 199, which includes a substantial 
cut in the number of available SMD seats (106). Candidates are still allowed to run on both 
the SMD and the national list tier. A big change concerns multiple office-holding: MPs in the 
newly elected parliament are not allowed to hold other elected (i.e. local) offices. These 
changes are potentially significant from the viewpoint of this study. In theory, a smaller 
parliament could increase the intra-party competition not only for re-election but for re-
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selection too. For SMD candidates it may facilitate constituency orientation, and at the same 
time a larger emphasis on party unity.iii 
 
Due to the lack of transparency, there is limited knowledge on the Hungarian parties’ 
candidate selection strategies. For the 2010 elections, there is only one comprehensive work 
which is based on a series of face-to-face interviews with party officials of four Hungarian 
parties (Fidesz, Jobbik, LMP and MSZP) (Marjai 2012). Although Marjai admits that the 
local level has strong powers in nominating candidates, in most cases national level decision-
makers can overwrite local decisions. The degree of decentralization is the highest in the case 
of MSZP, where the larger importance of the local level is demonstrated, with some control 
from the national level (Marjai, 2012, p. 49). However, the strong powers of the national party 
branch seems to be the rule rather than the exception. This gives Hungarian parties a 
considerable authority over their MPs. 
 
Nevertheless, strong party authority does not automatically imply party-centred MP 
behaviour. Personalisation and constituency orientation may easily be not only the initiative 
of re-election seeking legislators, but an integral part of a centralized party strategy. After all, 
the party is also interested in increasing the vote share of its candidates. Papp and Zorgit 
(2016) have shown that personalisation was a party strategy at the 2010 and 2014 Hungarian 
election campaigns during which parties knowingly utilized the local popularity of their 
candidates. Thus, it is rightly expected that centralised candidate selection does not overthrow 
the personalisation tendencies of individual MPs. However, in the case of list MPs who are 
not nominated in SMDs, parties may expect ultimate party loyalty, and a willingness to carry 
out tasks that are not directly translated into votes (Papp 2019). 
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Data and variables 
The article aims at testing the effect of mandate type and SMD candidacy on the 
representatives’ constituency orientation and the potential to dissent at roll-call votes. Both 
aspects are investigated through the role perception of the MPs, as well as observational data 
measuring the importance of constituency interests in the MPs’ parliamentary work, and 
defection from the party line. To measure perceptions, I use the Hungarian data from the 2010 
round of the Comparative Candidates Survey. Fieldwork was carried out right after the 
general elections. A face-to-face version of the questionnaire was utilised, which resulted in a 
sample of 232 representativesiv. To measure constituency orientation and dissent as 
behaviour, I rely on the official data published on the Hungarian Parliament’s website. 
Parliamentary questions and the individual MPs’ voting records are used to assess 
constituency orientation and defection in parliament. 
 
Constituency orientation: perceptions and behaviour 
To measure constituency orientation in the legislators' perceptions, the analysis utilizes the 
survey question ‘Who do you think you represent as a Member of the Hungarian 
Parliament?’. To identify constituency oriented legislators categories ‘my voters in my 
constituency’ and ‘my constituency’ were merged into ‘constituency oriented’ (45.6 percent 
of the sample), and ‘the voters of my party’, ‘a certain group in society’ and ‘all the citizens 
of the country’ into ‘not constituency oriented’ (54.4 percent). 
 
Parliamentary questions are used to tape the MPs' level of constituency orientation. 
Parliamentary questions offer legislators an opportunity to express their concern for local 
issues without having to influence legislation. They are widely used across European 
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democracies to request information from the government, but also to provide information to 
voters on MP work and priorities (Russo and Wiberg 2010). Questions are also increasingly 
used by scholars to describe the MPs' policy positions (Rozenberg et al. 2011; Saalfeld 2011; 
Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011) and representational focus such as constituency orientation 
(Chiru 2018; Martin 2011; Russo 2011). 
 
Hungarian MPs may submit interpellations, written, oral and direct questions. Although there 
are differences between these four types along the lines of the form of submissionv and 
responsevi, floor timevii and party controlviii, in this article they are handled as a homogeneous 
mass of questionsix. The localness of the questions was identified applying dictionary-based 
text analysis. Using a dictionary created from the official list of municipalities and countiesx, 
geographical names are registered in a corpus of questions submitted and/or tabled during the 
2010-2014 parliament. Questions that contain an item in the dictionaryxi (or any of its 
inflexions) are considered locally orientedxii. Questions then were aggregated to the MP-level 
showing the number of local questions submitted by the individual MPsxiii. The distribution of 
the resulting variable is shown in Figure 3 (a). 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Voting dissent: perceptions and behaviour 
Dissent at roll-call is often viewed as an indicator of the MPs’ position and role within their 
parties. While generally all MPs are expected to vote with the PPG, parties are more 
permissive towards MPs delivering a larger amount of personal vote. Depauw and Martin 
(2009) and Carey (2007) argue that it is the same electoral incentives (most importantly intra-
party competition) that encourage legislators to seek a personal vote and to defect at roll-call. 
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Similarly, Hix (2004) demonstrates that Members of the European Parliament who were 
elected in candidate-centred electoral systems are more likely to breach party unity than those 
elected under party-centred rules. Investigating the differences between SMD and list MPs in 
mixed-member electoral systems scholars have found that SMD MPs are more prone to 
dissent in Russia (Kunicova and Remington 2008), Germany (Sieberer 2010) and Hungary 
(Olivella and Tavits 2014). 
 
To capture the MPs’ willingness to dissent, they were asked to choose sides in hypothetical 
situations in which there is a conflict between the opinion of the voters, the party and the MPs 
themselves. The question was formulated as follows: ‘How should a Member of Parliament 
vote in parliament if … (1)… the voters in his/her constituency have one opinion and his/her 
party takes a different position, (2) …. his/her own opinion on an issue does not correspond 
with the party position?’. In other words, under what circumstances MPs think deserting the 
party line at roll-call is acceptable? 43.43 percent of the respondents would go with the party 
vote when the party position does not correspond with the voters’ opinion, while 65.33 
percent would chose the party position instead of their own. 
 
To account for dissent at roll-call, 2465 votes on 961 bills were taken into account during the 
2010-2014 parliament. Dissent is measured as the individual-level dissent ratio which is 
calculated using the number of votes at which the MP votes differently than her PPG, and the 
number of votes the MP participated at. The most frequent vote within the PPG at the given 
vote is considered the PPG votexiv. In the model I use the log-transformed version of the 
dissent ratio as dependent variable (see Figure 3 (b)). 
 
Independent variable 
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To find out how mandate type (SMD/list MP) and SMD candidacy at the previous election 
(yes/no) interact to influence the MPs’ role perceptions and activities I define a joint variable 
with three values: (1) SMD MPs and list MPs (2) with and (3) without SMD candidacy at the 
previous election (50, 25.9 and 24.1 percent respectively). It is implicitly assumed that former 
SMD candidacy is an admissible proxy for future ambitions (Carman and Shephard 2007; 
Zittel 2012).xv 
 
Control variables 
In addition to the above, the models include whether the MP was a mayor (Shugart, Valdini, 
and Suominen 2005; Tavits 2010), a party leader (Wahlke et al. 1962; Zittel 2012) and/or a 
newcomer (Fenno 1978; Norton and Wood 1990). Additionally, the ideological distance 
(Zittel and Gschwend 2008) between the MP and her party is taken into accountxvi, as well as 
whether the MP was selected by the party leadership as a candidate (Atmor, Hazan, and 
Rahat 2011; Depauw and Martin 2009; Sieberer 2010). The measure for Electoral security is 
borrowed from Olivella and Tavits (2014, 309) who defined the variable as the ‘distance 
between the candidate’s or list’s vote share and the effective electoral threshold’, which is 
calculated 0.75/(M+1) (Lijphart 1999), where M is the district magnitude. Regarding socio-
demographics, age and gender are also included into the models. 
 
Controlling for party affiliation and government status seems also desirable in models 
explaining questioning practices (Martin 2011) and dissent at roll-call (Depauw 2003; Kam 
2009; Owens 2003). However, this appears problematic due to the special features of the 
2010-2014 parliament, where almost all of the SMD seats (172 out of 176) belong to 
government parties (Fidesz and KDNP). This means that mandate type is highly collinear 
with the MPs' party affiliation. Out of 116 SMD MPs in the sample, 115 are affiliated with a 
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government party. Party affiliation is more evenly distributed in the group of list MPs: 48 
MPs are members of a government party, while 68 sit in opposition. To capture at least some 
of the differences between parties, I control for the MPs’ perception of their parties’ positions 
on the left-right scale. This variable significantly correlates both with party affiliation and 
government status, but is moderately correlated with mandate type. As a result of the high 
correlation between mandate type and party affiliation, the effect of mandate type 
incorporates differences between parties. Where this bias is expected to change conclusions, 
the analysis is carried out on the two sub-samples marked by the government vs. opposition 
distinction. 
 
 
Results 
While showing meaningful relationships, effects are often not significant in the statistical 
sense. Whereas the small sample size in the sub-groups of MPs may account for that, one also 
has to keep in mind that about 60 percent of the total population of MPs is sampled. With no 
known selection bias in the sample, sample figures may very well characterise the population 
of MPs even without statistical significance. Therefore, meaningful effects are also discussed 
in the article.xvii The following subsections focus on, first, legislators’ constituency 
orientation, and second, voting dissent. 
 
Explaining constituency orientation 
Binary logistic regression explains legislators’ constituency orientation in their role 
perceptions (see Supplementary Table 1(a) and Figure 4). The effect of mandate type and 
SMD candidacy is significant, and quite substantial. SMD MPs consider themselves 
constituency oriented with a probability of 0.73, while list MPs are less likely to have clear 
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constituency focus regardless of their former candidacy (0.24 and 0.12 probabilities 
respectivelyxviii). Additionally, there is no significant difference between the two groups of list 
MPsxix. Therefore, it appears that the difference between MP groups is the consequence of the 
mandate type which is a clear indication of the mandate divide. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
As to constituency orientation in the legislators' parliamentary questioning, the number of 
locally relevant questions is an overdispersed count variable: a lot of MPs ask no or only a 
few questions, while a few MPs submit a larger number of inquiries. Hence, negative 
binomial regression is used to test the effect of mandate type and SMD candidacy on the 
localness of questions (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Long 1997). On the one hand, as Figure 
5(a) – drawn based on the model in Supplementary Table 2 – indicates, the number of local 
questions submitted by SMD MPs and list MPs without SMD nomination is very modest. List 
MPs with SMD nomination on the other hand appear to frequently bring up local issues in 
parliament. This result could very well confirm the superior effect of the re-election incentive 
in the case of list MPs. 
 
However, keeping in mind that in 2010, almost all SMD MPs are members of Fidesz-KDNP, 
and therefore all list MPs with SMD nomination are from opposition parties, results may 
bring up a question. Do we see the dominance of list MPs with previous SMD nomination 
because they are also opposition MPs who try to control the government through 
parliamentary questions? To disentangle these two effects, the model was re-ran on the two 
sub-samples of government and opposition MPs. In the group of government MPs (Figure 
5(b)) SMD MPs ask about 1.5 questions on average, while list MPs with no SMD nomination 
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submit 0.72 inquiries. More importantly, there is no indication for the re-election incentive to 
have a significant effect in the opposition sub-sample (N=62; Figure 5(c)): the average 
question asked by list MPs with SMD nomination is 22.2, whereas list MPs with no SMD 
nomination ask even more locally relevant questions. Hence, it seems that local questioning is 
not primarily a tool for the opposition to ‘keep their SMD candidates in the game’ by focusing 
on local issues, but to control the government. However, this does not mean that opposition 
MPs do not use local questions at all to improve their chances at the next elections. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
To show how opposition MPs react to strategic challenges, the model was ran on the sub-
sample of SMD candidates including an interaction between mandate type and the electoral 
security of MPs. If electoral security makes a difference in how MPs utilize parliamentary 
questions, we may conclude that MPs strategically react to their positions within the SMDs, 
and thus respond to the re-election inventive. The variable Electoral margin measures the 
difference between SMD candidates finishing in the first and second places relative to the 
number of votes castxx. Small values indicate close races, while large values show the second 
candidate lagging behind the winner. Results presented by Figure 6 indicate that SMD MPs 
are not sensitive to changes in the electoral margin. SMD MPs in safe districts and those in 
‘close-call’ districts ask the same amount of local questions. The group of list MPs interested 
in the SMD competition, however, are quite diverse in terms of the number of local questions. 
SMD candidates ask more questions in districts where they suffered a larger defeat. Thus, it 
seems that list MPs use local questions to try lessening the gap between them and the winners 
of the districts. In this sense, results indicate that the re-election incentive is very well in 
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place, but only for list MPs, and government control is the key driving factor for submitting 
locally oriented questions. 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
Explaining voting dissent 
Now, turning to explaining maverick behaviour, Figure 7 presents the results of the binary 
logit models estimating the likelihood with which MPs promote to vote against the party 
position should it contradict with the voters' opinion and her own views. Model results are 
shown in Supplementary Table 1 (b)-(c). 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
Although there are no significant differences between MP groups, results reveal interesting 
tendencies. In the first case (Figure 7 (a)), SMD MPs think that they should vote in 
congruence with the voters' opinion (the probability of willingness to dissent is 0.6), whereas 
list MPs are more willing to follow the party line (Pr=0.49 and 0.52). The figures give larger 
support for the effect of the mandate incentive, although it is worth noting that all three 
groups show relatively high levels of willingness to vote against the party. 
 
In the second case, (Figure 7 (b)), legislators are generally less willing to dissent: SMD MPs 
score the lowest (Pr = 0.32) on this dimension, which suggests that mandate motivations are 
not in play in this scenario. Furthermore, weakening the re-election motivation narrative, list 
MPs with SMD candidacy (Pr = 0.37) are less willing to cross the party than list MPs with no 
SMD nomination (Pr = 0.42). Differences between groups, however, are again not significant. 
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For the estimation of individual dissent at roll-call as observed I use linear regression (see 
Supplementary Table 3). Differences between the three groups are statistically significant, 
although due to the generally high level of party unity in the Hungarian parliament, not 
sizeable. Interestingly, and contrary to expectations, and as shown on Figure 8 (a), SMD MPs 
are amongst the most disciplined. Furthermore, list MPs with SMD candidacy are more likely 
to dissent than those without. 
 
When looking at roll-call votes in parliament one has to acknowledge that MPs of different 
parties may act in systematically different ways. To maintain the stability of governance, 
government parties may take party unity more seriously than opposition parties. Therefore, to 
see if roll-call behaviour indeed shows the patterns similar to what was presented above, one 
needs to analyse the behaviour of government and opposition parties separately. Figure 8 (b) 
and (c) show the effects of mandate type and candidacy on dissent from models run separately 
on the two sub-samples of government and opposition MPs. Looking at government MPs, we 
do not see significant differences between SMD MPs and list MPs with no SMD candidacy. 
On the sample level, however, SMD MPs seem more prone to dissent. In the case of 
opposition MPs figures indicate no significant and meaningful difference between the two 
types of list MPs. 
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
Finally, similar to the analysis of local questions, Electoral margin is considered in an 
interaction with mandate type and SMD candidacy within the group of SMD candidates to 
find out if MPs strategically react to their positions within their SMDs. The dissent potential 
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of SMD MPs slightly increases with increasing margin: SMD MPs who are safe in their 
districts feel less vulnerable to de-selection by the party centre, and thus, are freer to follow 
other considerations at roll-call. Conversely, list MPs who lost with a big margin in the SMD 
are less valuable to their parties. Consequently, they must be more alert to the party’s 
position. 
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This study looks at the motivations of legislators to think and behave in a constituency 
oriented manner and to be willing to break party unity in parliament. The empirical part 
attempts to separate the re-election and the mandate incentives by investigating legislator 
attitudes and behaviour in a mixed-member electoral system with dual candidacy. Under such 
rules, it is possible to contrast the two types of motivations by comparing the behaviour of 
MPs holding different types of mandates as well as MPs with and without SMD candidacy. If 
MP behaviour forms along mandate type, it means that legislators react to the mandate 
incentive, while in the case of a difference between the different types of candidacies, MPs 
primarily respond to the re-election motivation. The article uses the 2010 Hungarian data 
from the Comparative Candidates Survey as well as the legislators’ official activity record 
between 2010 and 2014. Table 1 summarizes the results of the article. 
 
Table 1. The mandate and re-election incentives in constituency orientation and voting dissent 
  Mandate incentive Re-election incentive 
Constituency orientation Attitudes Present Not present 
 Behaviour Not present Present 
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Voting dissent Attitudes Present Not present 
 Behaviour Not present Present 
 
Results are far from straightforward. On the one hand, different incentives prevail in different 
cases. The mandate incentive strongly characterises the MPs' attitudes toward constituency 
orientation. MPs appear to be aware of what they were elected to do: SMD MPs tend to think 
they represent their constituencies, while list MPs (regardless of SMD candidacy) stand for 
representing other social groups. However, as to their willingness to dissent the party at roll-
call, no meaningful differences are observed between the various groups of MPs. 
 
On the other hand, contrary to the case of attitudes, the MPs’ behaviour is more strategic. List 
MPs who are nominated in SMDs submit a larger number of local questions, and are more 
likely to defect the party line at roll-call, than either SMD MPs or list MPs with no SMD 
candidacy. To confirm that electoral incentives are indeed in play, the effect of electoral 
margin is taken into account in the group of SMD candidates. It is shown that SMD 
candidates, and especially list MPs with SMD candidacy strategically react to their positions 
in the district level competition. This feature of MP behaviour further underlines the re-
election incentive. 
 
Results highlight an interesting tendency in the Hungarian legislators’ attitudes and 
behaviour. The fact that they act differently to what they think they should do uncovers a 
tension between the MPs’ work and how it is conceived. Politics becoming professionalized, 
MPs must keep their seats in parliament to secure their livelihoods. However, in doing this, 
list MPs who want to step up and become SMD MPs must also act as SMD MPs already in 
their positions as list MPs, even if they feel that this is not what they should do. 
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Nevertheless, the results related to the number of locally relevant questions are puzzling in a 
sense that although the re-election incentive is evidently present within the group of list MPs 
with SMD candidacy, no such conclusions are valid in the case of SMD MPs. It seems, that 
SMD MPs do not use parliamentary questions to convey a local message at all. This makes 
sense if we think about the amount of resources SMD MPs dispose of relative to list MPs: 
SMD MPs are able to represent local interests through more costly activities such as holding 
office hours in the constituency or engage in casework that, in terms of votes, probably pays 
better off. Conversely, list MPs have to express local concern applying less expensive 
methods, like parliamentary questions. As a result, list MPs who are involved into the 
competition for the SMD seats bring more local issues to the agenda as both SMD MPs and 
list MPs not running in SMDs. 
 
As all empirical studies, this work has also its limitations. Most importantly, it is not possible 
to take into account all aspects of the legislators’ work. Focusing only on parliamentary 
questions and dissent at roll-call leaves us in the dark about alternative measures MPs take to 
represent district interests. The danger of drawing the wrong consequences is mostly 
prominent in the case of SMD MP. Whereas electoral motivations appear in the case of list 
MPs in their questioning practices suggesting that questions indeed offer an opportunity to 
bring local issues to the agenda, and list MPs take it, the SMD MPs’ low activity in 
questioning does not mean that they do not take up local issues at all. If we could observe all 
their activities, we may see that they behave exactly the way they think they should as 
constituency representatives. This possibility could further strengthen evidence for the 
mandate incentives, but it does not mask evidence for the mixture of two incentives already 
provided by this study. 
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i Between 1990 and 2010, 84.8 percent of SMD candidates were also nominated on party lists. 
ii SMD candidates are systematically placed higher on party lists. Between 1990 and 2010, the relative list 
position (absolute list position/list length) of SMD candidates on regional and national list is significantly lower 
than that of list-only candidates (F=9556.4, p=0.000; F=271.44, p=0.000). 
iii The prospect of multiple office-holding to become prohibited can also change how SMD MPs act in 
parliament (roughly 82 percent of mayors in the sample are SMD MPs). The decreasing number of available 
seats mean that some SMD MPs will have to continue their careers as list MPs or as local office holders. SMD 
MPs might start preparing to give up their national mandates in exchange for their parties’ support at the local 
elections. In the case of MPs retiring from national level politics, it may be expected that constituency 
orientation prevails both as a re-election and a mandate incentive, because this is a convenient way to build a 
local supporter base for the local elections. 
iv The sample was randomly selected taking into account the distribution of MPs across party affiliation and 
mandate type. In the case of non-response, the MP was replaced by another with similar key features randomly 
selected from the group of MPs excluded from the initial sample. The sample represents the population of MPs 
with regards to party affiliation and mandate type rather well. 
v Interpellations, oral and written questions have to be submitted in writing, whereas direct questions are tabled 
without prior documentation. 
vi Interpellations, oral and direct questions are answered orally during the parliamentary session (each have their 
own schedule with fixed time limits), while written questions require written response. 
vii Interpellations, oral and direct questions require floor time, hence are limited in numbers. Conversely, as not 
asked in session, written questions require no such limitations. 
viii Naturally, the form of submission and response as well as time limitations affect how powerful each question 
is in controlling the government and capturing voter attention. Questions that are tabled during the sessions have 
the potential to receive greater attention than written questions. As these (oral) forms have also time limitations, 
the party centre takes up a greater role in organizing them. Contrarily, written questions capture a smaller portion 
of the spotlight, and are unlimited in numbers, making legislators free to use it without substantial interference 
from their parties. 
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ix Nevertheless, to make sure that the listed differences do not condition MPs to use considerably different 
approaches regarding the various questioning tools, I ran the models separately for all question types with 
substantively the same results. 
x The list was issues by the Hungarian Statistical Office (KSH). 
http://www.ksh.hu/apps/hntr.egyeb?p_lang=HU&p_sablon=LETOLTES, accessed on the 21st December, 2016. 
xi This time, localness is not defined as mentioning issues related to the SMD of the legislator, but as mentioning 
any issue regarding the local level. Although the most appropriate approach would be to account for the 
geographical constituency, it would exclude list MPs without SMD nomination from investigation, because they 
have no constituency based on which questions could be coded as local. Keeping these MPs in the sample as 
benchmark is crucial to answering the question of the paper. 
xii Although the coding of questions was fully computerised, all matches were double-checked manually. It was 
necessary because several municipalities have matching names with certain legislators (e.g. Varga, Semjén). 
Additionally, a large number of municipalities have names taken from ordinary language. 
xiii Questions submitted by multiple MPs are excluded from the analysis. 
xiv Admitting, that this method of measuring dissent may be subject to criticism, I also calculated an alternative 
measure of distance from the PPG. In this case, party positions are defined as cluster centred using k-means 
clustering, where the final number of clusters corresponds to the number of parties in the parliament. The 
normalised distance from the PPG is the distance between cluster centres and the individual MPs within the 
cluster. In order to be able to calculate the distance measure, missing values (i.e. votes at which the MP did not 
participate) were imputed with the PPG vote. In the case the complete PPG was absent, abstention was coded as 
the PPG vote. Although this approach might be viewed problematic, imputing the PPG vote did not change 
distance between legislators substantially. Models using this variable as dependent show identical results with 
the one presented in the article. For the sake of easier interpretation, I use the individual-level dissent ratio in the 
analysis. 
xv Although at the time of the investigation list MPs may win their mandates from regional and national party 
lists, for sample size considerations I do not break down this group into two. Distinguishing between regional 
and national list MPs does not change results in groups with sufficient sample size granting estimable 
coefficients. 
xvi Ideological distance is measured as the absolute difference between the MP’s self-reported placement on the 
left-right scale (11 points) and the MP’s assessment of the party’s position. 
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xvii Finite population correction (Hoyle 1999) cannot be applied in the case of models running on the various sub-
samples, because the sample was not randomly drawn from the respective sub-populations. Nevertheless, in 
several cases, corrected standard errors would allow for considering effects statistically significant. 
xviii χ2=27.97, p=0.000; χ2=20.04, p=0.000 
xix χ2=1.51, p=0.219 
xx Electoral margin is a better predictor of district competition than Electoral security. The latter was used in 
models ran on the whole sample because it allows for the comparison of SMD and list MPs. 
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Figure 1. Reasons why legislators carry out casework in 15 European countries 
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Figure 2. An expected realization of the re-election and the incumbency incentive 
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Figure 3. The Kernel density estimation of the number of local questions and individual 
dissent at roll-call 
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Figure 4. The predicted probabilities of constituency orientation across mandate type and 
SMD candidacy at the next election (CI: 95 %) 
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Figure 7. The predicted probabilities of the willingness to dissent (CI: 95 %) 
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Figure 5. The estimated number of local questions across mandate type and SMD candidacy 
(CI: 95 %) 
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Figure 6. The predicted number of local questions over electoral margin across mandate type 
and SMD candidacy (CI: 95 %) 
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Figure 8. The expected values of the logged dissent ratio across mandate type and SMD 
candidacy (CI: 95 %) 
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Figure 9. The expected values of the logged dissent ratio over electoral margin across 
mandate type and SMD candidacy (CI: 95 %) 
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